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Abstract
To the modern law enforcement investigator, the potential for an offender to have a mobile device on his or her
person, who connects to a Wi-Fi network, may afford evidence to place them at a scene, at a particular time.
Whilst tools to interrogate mobile devices and Wi-Fi networks, have undergone significant development, little
research has been conducted with regards to interrogating Wi-Fi routers and the evidence they may contain.
This paper demonstrates that multiple inhibiting factors exist for forensic investigators when attempting to
extract data from Wi-Fi routers at the scene. Data volatility means the Wi-Fi router cannot be powered down
without losing a substantial quantity of data. Third party Wi-Fi enabled devices may connect to or interact with
the access point after an event occurs. Multiple models exist, with varying internal architectures, operating
systems, and external interfaces. This paper presents steps and considerations for at scene seizure of Wi-Fi
devices for law enforcement, to ensure maximum digital forensic evidence is collected. It also lists a series of
recommendations to the manufacturers of Wi-Fi devices to facilitate a standardised mechanism to collect
forensic evidence, thus making future acquisitions easier and time efficient.
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INTRODUCTION
In Australia, the quantity of active Wi-Fi access points found throughout homes and businesses is continually
increasing, as the technology becomes commonplace in many consumer grade networking and mobile devices
(Potts, 2014). Internet Service Providers (ISPs) supply customers with Wi-Fi enabled devices as packages
integrated with broadband contracts. Manufacturers typically enable Wi-Fi on smart phones, laptops and
computers by default to streamline the configuration and networking process – improving perceived usability.
The Wi-Fi enabled feature may also remain active purposefully, or unknowingly post-configuration.
Alternatively, it is common practice for software and firmware upgrades to enable previously disabled Wi-Fi
functionality on mobile computing devices such as the iPhone (Althuser, 2015). Enabling the Wi-Fi feature on
smartphones after an update has occurred, streamlines the process of finalising the update process.
Australia’s use of smart phones, is reaching saturation. Approximately 85% of Australia’s mobile phone owners,
use a smartphone as their primary mobile phone device (Rogers, 2015). Smartphones are versatile portable
computing devices with benefits and feature set for all types of consumers. The tablet computer market is
equally as prevalent. In 2014, approximately 55% of Australian tablet computer owners were accessing the
Internet through Wi-Fi in contrast to approximately 15% of owners accessing the Internet through a dedicated
3G/4G network (ACMA, 2014). The widespread use of Wi-Fi technology amongst end-users may result in
digital evidence of interest being present on Wi-Fi routers, for use in subsequent civil or criminal investigations.
Obtaining data of interest from Wi-Fi networking devices encompasses a series of challenges. For instance, WiFi routers cannot be powered off without losing a significant quantity of data stored in volatile memory
(Szewczyk, 2009). Subtle variations between Wi-Fi devices and their respective models, may prove problematic
in attempting to use a standardised approach to extract data of interest (Liu, Chen, Yu & Fu, 2010). Furthermore,
third party Wi-Fi enabled devices (e.g. a smartphone) may connect to, or interact with an access point,
potentially erasing or overwriting previously stored evidentiary data. As a result it is important that first
responders at the scene are adequately prepared and informed when operating in time critical situations.
This paper presents a series of empirical experiments and considerations for at scene seizure of Wi-Fi devices to
ensure maximum digital forensic evidence is preserved and collected by first responders. The paper uses a law
enforcement perspective in an attempt to identify and propose strategies that could be utilised by first responders
at the scene. This paper also outlines a series of recommendations focusing towards the manufacturers of Wi-Fi
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devices that would enable standardised methods to be used to collect evidence of interest, thus making collection
easier and more time efficient.
The importance of wireless devices
Wi-Fi routers have received limited research focus from a digital forensics perspective (Akers, McGrew &
Dampier, 2011; Minnaard, 2014; Turnbull & Slay, 2008). However those investigations, which have been
conducted, have discovered that a wealth of information can be gained from networking devices in general (Fu,
Zhang, Pingley, Yu, Wang & Zhao, 2012; Liu, et al., 2010; Szewczyk, 2011). A typical consumer grade Wi-Fi
router has the ability to record and store at a minimum the:






Media Access Control (MAC) address of connected devices;
Logs of successful or failed authentication attempts;
De-authenticated logs;
Date and time, typically synced to a Network Time Protocol (NTP) Server; and
User generated names of mobile computing devices.

A Wi-Fi router may also capture probe requests from Wi-Fi enabled mobile devices within the vicinity. Probe
requests are special periodic requests used to identify what networks are currently active and available. Some
consumer level Wi-Fi routers have been found to record these requests along with the device’s MAC address
(Turnbull & Slay, 2008). A MAC address of a device is a significant finding given that no two devices should
theoretically have the same address (IEEE, 2015). This means that any MAC address that is recorded should be
unique to that device and that device alone. Further to this, the first three bytes of a MAC address signifies the
Organisation Unique Identifier (OUI) and allows inquiries to be conducted with the manufacturer to determine
who purchased it and where the device was sold (Holman, 2012). This could assist in the identification of a
Person Of Interest (POI). A study by the Australian Institute of Criminology found that of the 479 homicides in
Australia between 2010-2012, 362 of these, or 75% of the offenders were well known to the victim (AIC, 2015).
This may suggest the presence, at the time of a criminal act, successful authentication attempts, if the offender
had been trusted and thus given access credentials to the victims’ Wi-Fi network.
Mobile computing devices will attempt to automatically reconnect to a previously connected Wi-Fi router when
within range. Following a successful connection, the router’s logging mechanism may record this connection and
include the name of the device, the MAC address, the local (IP) address issued and the time/date the device
authenticated and de-authenticated from the wireless network. For the legal community, to place a device owned
by an individual at a location at a guaranteed time, may provide a fundamental piece of evidence to a case. As
many Wi-Fi routers are pre-configured to connect to NTP servers around the world to keep accurate times, this
automatically reduces the possibility the device could be recording inaccurate dates or times. Whilst some
challenges exist to prove that a POI had the mobile device on their person at the time, the circumstantial
evidence, paired with other evidence may lead to a successful prosecution or finding of guilt.
The names of any device recorded may also offer investigators a line of inquiry, where the offender is unknown.
In many cases it has been found that owners have named their devices based on their full name or part thereof
(Könings, 2013). Whilst there have been advances with antennas, power output and attempts to reduce the noise
surrounding the Wi-Fi network, the majority of consumer level routers provide only local connectivity typically
for a household’s device (Hamida & Chelius 2010; Fu et al., 2012). Therefore, any connectivity by a POI would
need to be localised.

TECHNICAL PROCESSES
The aim of this study was to obtain a range of consumer level Wi-Fi routers and interrogate those devices to
determine the quantity and usefulness of data that could be obtained from them by a first responder. Twenty
consumer grade Wi-Fi routers were used for experimentation. The Wi-Fi routers were biasedly chosen based on
devices previously seized by Police as part of investigations. This enables an authentic assessment to be
undertaken based on previously encountered networking devices that would be maintained by end-users. To
maintain the chain of custody, each device was individually labelled and photographed with its exhibit number.
Documentation for each device and experiment was maintained. Photographs formed part of the inspection
process as any damage was recorded along with accessible ports, internal hardware characteristics and
model/revision numbers. To minimise anomalies being introduced into the tests due to environmental conditions,
all experiments were undertaken under the same environmental conditions. Where possible, a faraday room was
utilised to eliminate further environmental factors. Each device was restored to its factory default setting
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replicating the typical Wi-Fi router’s state experienced by end-users when installing a router. Table 1 depicts the
brand, model and device version of the Wi-Fi routers used within this research.
Device #
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Table 1 - Wi-Fi routers used for experimentation
Brand
Model
Version/Revision
Tompson
TL-WR1043ND
v1
Netgear
WGR614v9
v9
Belkin
P10808au
v1
TP-Link
TL-WR1043ND
v1
Linksys
WRT54GL
v1.1
2-Wire
2071
vA
Belkin
F5D8636-4
v1
Thompson
TG782T
v1
iiNet/Boblite
GL411
B
Netgear
DG834G
v4
Billion
740GE
v1
D-Link
604
vA3
Linksys
WRT54G
v7
iiNet/Belkin
F1P1234EGau
V1
Cisco
AP-1231G-A-K9
v1
Cisco
AP-1121G-A-K9
v1
Linksys
WAP54G
v3
Linksys
WRT54G
v1
Tp-Link
WDR4300
v1
Netgear
DGND4000
v1

Signal and Noise Level Tests
The purpose of the first test was to isolate the Wi-Fi router from interacting with third party devices. Each
network device can produce different Wi-Fi signal strengths, thus a controlled test or baseline was firstly
established. Creating a controlled test provides a mechanism to verify that the changes introduced were not as a
result of an external factor. Following any change to the device, the results were verified against the control test
to determine possible differences. A Rohde & Schwartz Spectrum Analyser model ‘FSL’ was utilised to measure
the power output of each device in decibel megawatts (dBm). The output range for the Wi-Fi routers were
measured from 0 to -100dBm. The closer the value to zero, the stronger the signal strength.
As the spectrum analyser samples the environment and cannot distinguish a single individual Wi-Fi router,
environmental noise was also sampled. Environmental noise simulates a real life situation. Once the testing
environment was established, each Wi-Fi router was moved further away from the spectrum analyser and the
signal and noise levels were remeasured. The distances selected for measurements were at 1, 2, 3 and 5 meters.
The following tests were performed at the aforementioned distances:


Remove external antennas (where antennas were present);



Remove one and then both antennas (where the device had more than one antenna);



Creating an ad-hoc faraday cage using aluminium foil;



Creating an ad-hoc faraday cage using aluminium foil with exposed holes;



Creating an ad-hoc faraday cage around the antennas using aluminium foil;



De-soldering or cutting the antenna connections from the logic board; and



De-soldering or cutting internal or external antennas and wrapping the remaining body in
aluminium foil;

Log Files
A series of experiments were conducted to determine how long the log files on the Wi-Fi router were beneficial
to a forensic investigator before they were deleted by the router’s operating system. This experiment utilised Kali
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Linux 2.0 and the Aircrack-ng packages (included in the Kali Linux distribution). Some devices provide granular
log file configuration. Overall, the configuration categorises incidents into one of three events:


Administrative events - Administer configuration changes along with power-up and start-up events
are logged.



Firewall events - Blocked incidents, port scans, access attempts from inside the network to sites on
a block list, logged.



Full/Detailed logging - All services including DHCP and wireless access including MAC addresses
are logged.

A laptop was utilised to send large quantities of authentication data to the Wi-Fi router. The laptop was
configured in monitor mode. Monitor mode allows the laptop to capture network traffic, without being
associated with an access point and therefore announcing its presence. The following command placed the laptop
into monitor mode:
# airmon-ng start wlan0
The mdk3 package was utilised to attack each Wi-Fi router, based on the Wi-Fi’s MAC address of
44:94:fc:1b:1c:fb. This package utilises an authentication attack (a switch). The –m switch sets the authentication
attack to use real world MAC addresses:
# mdk3 wlan0mon a -m -a 44:94:fc:1b:1c:fb
With continuous monitoring of the log file of the Wi-Fi router, the log was timed to see how long before it filled
and rotated. A final test utilised Kali Linux to send DHCPDISCOVER packets to the Wi-Fi router. These
packets request a local Internet Protocol (IP) address from the Wi-Fi router. Continuous DHCPDISCOVER
requests were made using the following command:
# dhcpx -i eth0
Memory
Volatile memory will typically contain portions of the log files, as these are written to memory before they are
written to a file. A series of experiments were conducted to see how long a listing would remain in memory,
despite the log file being deleted. A connection attempt was made from a laptop with a MAC address
00:e0:00:a7:24:66 and the log files were checked to ensure this MAC address could be found (Figure 2).

Figure 2 - MAC addresses authenticating
The laptop was connected to the Wi-Fi router using a shell and a capture was completed using the following
command:
# dd if=/dev/mem of=memory-dump.bin
This wrote the contents of the Wi-Fi router’s memory to a file called memory-dump.bin. A laptop was then
utilised to check the file for the last known MAC address:
# cat memory-dump.bin | grep 00:e0:00:a7:24:66
On confirmation, the Wi-Fi router was then flooded with as many authentication requests as possible. At each
30-second interval, the same commands were rerun until the laptop’s MAC address could no longer be found in
memory.
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RESULTS
Throughout this analysis a number of tests were undertaken, ultimately with the aim of gaining access to the WiFi router to preserve the logs and volatile memory. Further tests were conducted to determine the lifespan of the
log files, and therefore the criticality to have an investigator attend a scene to ensure they were preserved.
Overall, it was found once the device lost power, the log files were deleted. The configuration files were not
however affected by the loss of power, and could have potential evidentiary value.
Device
number

Non Volatile
RAM

1
2
3
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

8Mb
2Mb
2Mb
8Mb
4Mb
128Mb
8Mb
64Mb
16Mb
4Mb
2Mb
2Mb
4Mb
8Mb
8Mb
8Mb
4Mb
4Mb
8Mb

Table 2 - Characteristics of Wi-Fi routers tested
Volatile
Shell
Shell
On-board
RAM
available accessible
connectors
128Mb
8Mb
256Mb
32Mb
128Mb
256Mb
32Mb
256Mb
512Mb
4Mb
8Mb
16Mb
8Mb
16Mb
32Mb
128Mb
8Mb
16Mb
128Mb

Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Logging enabled
(Admin/Firewall/
Full)
Admin
Admin
Admin
Full
Admin
Admin
Admin
Admin
Firewall
Firewall
Admin
Firewall
Admin
Firewall
Admin
Admin
Full
Full
Full

Logging
Sixteen of the twenty devices inspected had little or no logging enabled by default, despite having the capability
to log more extensive information. The devices which did log events, only stored administrative functions, such
as logins, and power up events. It is unclear if the manufacturer reduced the logging functionality to minimise
the required space on the device. Four of the twenty devices had logging enabled to a sufficient level that it
would capture Domain Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) assignments (Figure 3).

[DHCP IP: (192.168.0.8)] to MAC address 90:B9:31:4A:FF:46 Tuesday, October 06,2015 07:59:57
[DHCP IP: (192.168.0.16)] to MAC address 90:B9:31:CA:65:C1 Tuesday, October 06,2015 07:47:52
[DHCP IP: (192.168.0.12)] to MAC address 00:16:CB:B7:2E:92 Tuesday, October 06,2015 07:39:18

Figure 3- DHCP assignments for the Netgear DGND4000 “webgenie” interface
No devices had default logging capabilities to capture beacon/probe request packets and no devices had logging
enabled to capture Wi-Fi authentication packets, despite this logging feature being available. During
experimentation with a TP-Link TL-WDR4300, it was found that a brute force authentication attack using real
world MAC addresses caused the log file to rotate within 14 minutes and 50 seconds. Conducting the same
experiment, slowing the authentication attack to one attempt per second caused the log file to rotate after 26
minutes. Further experiments on a Linksys WRTG54G, which had approximately 8Mb of non-volatile RAM,
found the device only allowed 204Kb of log files before rotating the log file. This 204Kb equated to
approximately 1582 lines of data.
Further tests, using DHCPDISCOVER packets to request an IP address from a Netgear DGND4000, showed that
the webpage log file contained a maximum of 261 lines of information. One packet request was sent per second
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and despite some of these packets being ignored, the log file filled in 7 minutes and 31seconds. Once the log file
had been rotated in both scenarios, the old log files were erased and no longer accessible on the device.
Antennas and Signal Strength
The devices investigated were found to have either an external or internal antenna (or a combination of both).
For the first responding forensic investigator, this highlights the importance of properly inspecting the device
internally and externally, without making assumptions that the external antenna is the only point for Wi-Fi
transmission (Figure 4).

Figure 4 - F Antenna as found on a Thompson Bigpond TG782T device
Immediately after disconnecting the external antenna on the Thompson TG782T Wi-Fi router, it switched to the
internal F antenna, thus preserving signal strength. Several Wi-Fi routers had similar antenna arrangements.
Many Wi-Fi routers allow their external antennas to be removed. Removing any number of these antennas
significantly reduces the ability for the router to provide an effective signal; however leaving any number of
antennas still connected allowed the router to still transmit data effectively. Where a device had an internal
aerial, which had been soldered directly to the circuit board, these antennas were either de-soldered from the
circuit board or their shielded cable was cut (Figure 4). If the cable was cleanly cut and the wire was shielded,
the device had no ability to transmit or receive data and was thus the Wi-Fi was deemed isolated.

Figure 5 - Internal aerial as found on the iiNet Boblite GL411 device
A number of subject devices were tested using aluminium foil to block Wi-Fi data transmission. In all cases
where aluminium foil was utilised to cover the entire device, the device was unable to communicate effectively.
In cases where there was an opening in the aluminium foil, irrespective of where the opening was located, radio
frequencies were able to leak beyond the confines of the aluminium foil (Figure 6). Similar risks could result
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with the use of faraday bags, particularly in cases where the device needs to be kept powered. This is an
important facet for a first responder to consider to minimise the contamination of evidence on the Wi-Fi router.

Figure 6 - TP-Link TL-WR1043ND covered in aluminium foil with large opening at the front
Memory
A brute force Wi-Fi authentication attack on a TP-Link WR1043ND, demonstrated that within 8 minutes the
memory had been overwritten. During this time approximately 91,000 attempted connections were made. It was
also found that the log files had been rotated. This meant that all history associated with a specific connection,
prior to the attack, no longer resided in either the log files or the memory of the device. A subsequent
authentication attack, limiting the authentication attacks to one attack per second, found that while the log files
had been rotated, the memory still retained details after the 3 hour period of testing.
Additional tests within a busy office environment, in which the device had extensive network traffic, found the
device typically only retained data for a maximum of 12 hours. After this period the chance of extracting a MAC
address authentication request was minimal. These results suggest memory usage is extremely dependent on:




The amount of traffic traversing the network;
The number of authentication attempts; and
The amount of free or available memory on the device.

Access Issues
For the majority of consumer grade Wi-Fi routers the ability to gain access via terminal or a shell has been
removed as manufacturers have set an administration password, which is unknown and not included with
product literature. In some Wi-Fi routers it was found the device allowed users shell access and then a firmware
update later precluded this access (Turnbull & Slay, 2008). In the absence of a shell or terminal, ram captures are
inhibited and detailed log analysis is reduced. The ability to connect to the Wi-Fi router’s administration web
interface is made difficult without the correct authentication credentials. However in some cases, the default
administration details were found on the underside of the modem (Figure 7).
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Figure 7 - Thomson branded ST585v6 Wi-Fi Modem sticker from underside
During inspection of the logic boards, some Wi-Fi routers had possible JTAG and serial port connections. These
connections could potentially allow access via a console or a direct download. Typically these connections
mitigate the need for access credentials. Ensuring the Wi-Fi router is powered on whilst removing the external
casing to establish suitable connection points is challenging. Many of the pin configurations were unlabelled,
and thus further analysis and research would be required, along with a suitable live-capture procedure.
In the absence of on board connections, the only remaining forensic process would be that of chip-off forensics.
This technique involves the physical removal, using heat, to de-solder the microchip from the circuit board. Once
removed, the microchip can then be connected to a NAND flash reader and its data subsequently interpreted.
Typically this style of forensic exploration causes physical destruction to the device with the potential to negate
the integrity of data and future operation of the Wi-Fi router.

DISCUSSION
Detailed Notes
During forensic investigations it is imperative that the investigator maintains detailed contemporaneous notes
throughout the task. These notes should be similar to that of a police running sheet so the results can be utilised
as evidence in court. The notes should also include the goals which were to be attempted, the actions towards
reaching those goals, any critical decisions which were made at the time, the outcome – success or failure and
the reasons why. Detailed notes are further critical in investigating Wi-Fi routers in that the process utilised may
not necessarily work successfully on similar devices. This is an unfortunate factor associated with vendors
revising and altering the hardware and software of each device, which is identified through associated revision
numbers (i.e. A5).
Isolating and Seizing Devices
Wi-Fi routers can be sensitive and susceptible to forensic contamination, particularly if they are listening and
logging beacon packets or possible authentication attempts. Once a crime scene has been declared, any Wi-Fi
transmitting or receiving devices should be strictly quarantined from the area of concern. The Wi-Fi router
should be kept powered up and isolated, with network connections disconnected. External antennas should be
removed and the device should be preferably placed in a sealed faraday bag. However if one is not available to
the first responder, it should at least be entirely covered in aluminium foil (with no holes present) to suppress any
radio frequencies. In all cases where a live forensic acquisition is to be completed, the Wi-Fi router will need to
be transported whilst powered on or evidence extracted at the scene.
Database of Devices
It is recommended that further research is undertaken to build a central database documenting Wi-Fi router
specifications and characteristics. Once implemented, forensic investigators who have access to the database
would benefit by accessing a quick point of reference, and increasing their knowledge of devices and evidence
that may be afforded. The proposed database structure could use the following components:
1

Wi-Fi router table detailing the:
 Device model number;
 Hardware version ;
 Photograph(s) of the device; and
 Other specific device information.
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The Wi-Fi table shows the physical device based on what can be read on it’s labels and viewed in photographs.
2

A one-to-one relationship, star rating table.
 An indication of how forensically beneficial interrogating the device would be; and
 A explanation of the associated rating.

The star-rating table gives an overall rating of the ability for an examiner to collect data from the device. A
single star rating may indicate a poor indicator whilst a high star rating could indicate shell access with the
ability to download memory in a forensically sound manner. This information would benefit the first responder
in adequately preparing for the at scene investigation.
3

A many-to-one relationship, hardware version table detailing:
 A hardware and firmware version of a device logic board;
 The number of serial ports on the device;
 The number of internal and external aerials; and
 Possible other hardware specific information;

The hardware version table records the differences between multiple software versions. Additionally it records
the differences in the internal, component level designs of multiple devices.
4

A JTAG and serial access table
 Detail circuit board pin outs; and
 Configuration (including photographs to facilitate the process).

The JTAG/Serial Table addresses interfacing issues with the hardware of different devices.
5

A Firmware version table linked to the hardware version detailing:
 Versions of firmware;
 Default authentication credentials; and
 Known access credentials from manufactures.

A firmware version table would address the software differences along with the access credentials for those
firmware versions.
6

An exploitability-rating table:
 A rating for the possible security/exploitation of the device; and
 An explanation of the metric for the rating.

The intention for this table is to demonstrate how exploitable the device firmware or hardware is for gaining
access to the device. Should a device be more exploitable a higher rating maybe provider, a lower rating might
demonstrate a device which is more secure.
7

A vulnerability assessment table with examples of successful vulnerabilities;

This table holds vulnerabilities and how they might relate to a device.
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Figure 8: The proposed conceptual diagram of the database required
Standards
Despite the limited number of devices examined during this research, it was found that the multitude of Wi-Fi
routers function differently from one another. Manufacturers regularly change the devices between firmware and
hardware versions to suit their needs, and are typically motivated by financial reasons (Constantin, 2014).
Manufacturing standards for Wi-Fi devices would be beneficial for subsequent law enforcement based
investigations. Establishing these standards in Australia would provide several advantages:




The device’s data of interest could be extracted more accurately;
The manner of obtaining data of interest would be simplified; and
Training of forensic investigators would be simplified;

For these standards to be accepted by consumers, they need a simple way to recognise the Wi-Fi router they are
about to purchase is both:



A secure device for their day-to-day internet activities, produced by a legitimate Australian
authorised identity; and
A device that law enforcement agents can if required gain access to with minimal disruption.
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A possible law enforcement tick of approval, or symbol, is a suitable example. This symbol can be placed on the
packaging of manufactured products to educate consumers of the benefits of purchasing this device over another,
which features no approval. For manufacturers to obtain this tick, they will need to conform to a series of
requirements. Similar outlines have been presented to the manufacturers and customers purchasing CCTV
systems (ANZPAA, 2014). For Wi-Fi devices, the most obvious need is a mechanism to connect and download
the data of interest applicable to the device.

CONCLUSION
The Wi-Fi router could contain a critical piece of evidence for a forensic investigator. The ability to place an
offender at a specific time and place, based on capturing their mobile device information, could lead to either a
successful prosecution or plead of guilt.
However, as demonstrated through this research paper, multiple issues exist for extracting data of interest. The
data capture is potentially costly, due to the differences in hardware, software and lack of standardisation
amongst devices. In addition this capture typically needs to be completed at a scene, with the device remaining
powered up. Due to these costs, further research is required before a comprehensive framework can be
developed and put into the public domain to support first responders. A detailed database of Wi-Fi router
specifications and characteristics could be used within the courts and legal practices of Australia.
Future research will focus on the development of an open accessed detailed database encompassing a range of
Wi-Fi routers available in Australia. It is anticipated that the sharing of knowledge by various communities will
facilitate the streamlined process of data extraction from Wi-Fi routers. Ultimately this further research of Wi-Fi
routers and the potential evidence to law enforcement and Australian courts will assist making the community a
safer place.
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